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A brief history of the debt crisis - SLUGDet handler ikke om veldedighet. Det handler om rettferdighet.
Many countries gained independence from colonial rule in the 1940s, ’50s and ’60s. Fresh with hope, newly elected leaders like Nehru in India and Nkrumah in Ghana came to power with bold visions. Many began working with their ministers to devise schemes to promote the growth of local industries. Unlike in the past, where national economic policies had been dictated by colonial priorities, the leaders of newly independent countries had an opportunity to devise growth strategies solely for the benefit of their countries’ people.
Text from "Unfinished business - Ten years of dropping the debt"

After gaining independence, these leaders were approached by banks and governments in wealthy countries offering them loans
at generously discounted interest rates. ‘Need to build a dam? Do it at five percent, even though the market rate is far higher.’
It all appeared too good to be true. And it was.
Unfortunately, most of the lenders didn’t have the interests of citizens in borrower countries in mind. This was the era of
the Cold War. The United States and its allies were afraid that whichever countries weren’t made into friends would turn to
the communists. The Soviets harboured reciprocal fears. Between the two competing empires, the US and the USSR, poor countries
took on massive amounts of debt, usually for reasons that were not economically sound. As author Noreena Hertz reports, “More
often than not, the lending process was so distorted by geopolitics that the logic that underpins sound borrowing ... was
simply absent. As, too, was the criterion that underpins sound lending - that the borrower will likely be able to repay the
loan.” (1)
Trouble deepened with the oil crisis. In 1973, major oil-producing countries hiked their prices, made huge sums of money,
and deposited those sums in dollars in western banks. Other economic changes, such as the end of the pegging of the US dollar
to gold, flooded markets with cheap money. Interest rates plummeted, starting off a domino effect. To stop the slide and avoid
an international crisis, banks decided to lend more money quickly and lavishly to poor countries. They did this without much
thought about how the money would be used or if borrowers had the ability to repay. Poor countries took on even more debt:
the value of poor country debt spiralled from around $70.2 billion in 1970 to $579.6 billion in 1980. (2)
From the late-1970s onwards, poor countries were delivered a triple blow from world markets: an unprecedented rise in interest
rates, led by the US as a result of the fiscal conservatism of newly elected President Reagan; ensuing deflation that caused
a dramatic slump in the price of commodities (like coffee and copper) on which poor countries’ incomes depended; and another
huge increase in the price of oil.
The trap was sprung – poor countries were earning less than ever for their exports and paying more than ever on their loans
and on what they needed to import. They had to borrow more money just to pay off the interest. That cycle has continued ever
since.
Up to the early 1980s, banks had been recklessly lending to poor countries in the belief that they were a safe bet: whatever
their problems, countries didn’t go bankrupt. In 1982, Mexico threatened to do just that by defaulting on its debts. The entire
global financial system looked exposed, and rich countries and institutions had to do something about it. But their efforts
– whether in bilateral discussions, ad hoc schemes such as the Brady Plans,(3) or the internationally agreed Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) scheme launched in the mid-1990s (explained on page 16 below) – were all aimed at protecting both creditors
and the financial system, rather than fundamentally resolving the debt crisis for poor countries.
In the early 1980s, the interest rates on the loans tripled and even quadrupled, causing the debt crisis. While these interest
rates have since come down, developing countries continue to be burdened with huge debts which many cannot afford to repay.
The total external debt stock (that is, owed to creditors outside the country) of all developing countries in 2005 was $2.74
trillion, with some $514 billion paid back to the rich world that year alone. (4) This consists of: multilateral debt, owed
to institutions like the World Bank and regional banks; bilateral debt owed to other countries; and commercial debt owed to
banks and private companies.
To repay this debt, poor countries have to forego crucial spending to meet their people’s basic needs and to reduce poverty.
Debt is one of the main barriers to development in poor countries today. (5) Moreover, successive generations are still paying
off odious and illegitimate debts – incurred by loans made to oppressive regimes; to known corrupt officials; for obviously
useless or overpriced projects; or granted on unacceptable terms, such as usurious interest rates. These should be cancelled
on the basis of their illegitimacy.
Debt relief schemes impose conditions on countries that wish to benefit from them, often including a host of economic policy
conditions, such as privatizations of state-run enterprises, opening of markets, and drastic public spending cuts. These reforms
often harm the poorest people, for example cutting their wages and reducing their access to basic services. They also undermine
democracy: if policies are determined in Washington, local parliaments become powerless, and political engagement becomes
meaningless.

“Clear geopolitical interest dictated lending policy throughout the Cold War. This meant that both tyrannical regimes and regimes
that didn’t even pay lip service to the lenders’ ideological beliefs were bankrolled by the West and the East to secure allegiance or to realise strategic goals. Zaire was lent money by the Americans although it never adopted a free market economy.
Angola was lent money by the Soviets despite its insincere playacting at socialism. Saddam Hussein was lent money by the West
and Arab states up until the 1991 Gulf War, despite the fact that his chemical gas bombing of the Kurdish city of Halabja
in 1998, which killed 5,000 of his own people and wounded 10,000 others, was by then common knowledge. The Argentinian military
junta of the 1970s was lent money by the United States, despite the fact that it was known to be ‘disappearing’ tens of thousands
of people during its reign.” NOREENA HERTZ, FROM THE DEBT THREAT (6)
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